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NEW ANTI-MERGER THEORIES: A CRITIQUE 
Edward J. Ló pez 
Does recent federal merger regulation make economic sense? 
Merger activity has clearly increased this decade, both in the numbers 
of mergers and their market value. Whether antitrust regulators have 
responded with a proportional increase in enforcement is up for de­
bate. What is clear, however, is that regulators at the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission have 
begun to enforce merger laws in innovative ways. These innovations 
have developed not in academic literature but within government 
agencies themselves. “Innovation market” analysis evaluates a merger 
between technologically advanced firms based on the effects of the 
merger on research and development in the relevant market. “Uni­
lateral effect” analysis evaluates a merger on the ability of the merged 
firm to singularly influence price in the relevant market. These in­
struments—which I explain in detail below—have been employed 
explicitly and implicitly in dozens of antitrust cases and investigations 
since 1993. They have been observed as the intellectual force sup­
porting the current revival of antitrust enforcement (The Economist 
1998b, Price 1997). And regulators have accepted them seemingly 
wholesale as sound guides to policy action. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these new anti-merger 
instruments on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first 
discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, 
with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 
1990s’ antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each 
anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and 
how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of 
these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the 
Cato Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 2001). Copyright © Cato Institute. All rights 
reserved. 
Edward Ló pez is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of 
North Texas. He thanks George Bittlingmayer, Don Boudreaux, Jerry Ellig, James Gattuso, 
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theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and in­
novation markets to merger investigations. 
The Economics of Antitrust 
Early Theory 
The economics of antitrust originates with the structure-conduct­
performance (SCP) paradigm founded in the late 1940s and early 
1950s (Mason 1939, 1949; Bain 1956). The SCP approach underlies 
the basic microeconomic model taught in principles textbooks today. 
Industries are situated on a continuum between the fictional extremes 
of perfect competition and perfect monopoly. Industries which fall 
closer to perfect monopoly are more “concentrated.” Competitive 
industries exhibit low prices and high quantities, and produce the 
highest possible benefits to society—i.e., they are efficient. Monopo­
lies exhibit high prices, low quantities, and socially wasteful alloca­
tions of resources—i.e., they are inefficient. In short, once the struc­
ture of an industry is defined (where on the continuum the market 
falls), the conduct of the firms will also be defined (price and quantity 
selections), and, as such, the performance of the industry can be 
determined (whether the market is good for society). Indeed, the 
SCP approach yields a central conclusion: The degree to which an 
industry departs from the model of perfect competition—as mea­
sured by industry concentration—determines the departure from the 
societal ideal. In other words, the theory concludes that there is a 
negative correlation between industry concentration and the societal 
welfare produced by that market. 
This was truly a monumental theoretical achievement, as the pre­
diction distilled decades of academic discourse, building upon the 
intellectual inheritance of two centuries of economic thought, into a 
single statistic. Federal regulators had merely to devise a method by 
which to measure concentration, and apply the benchmark to real 
markets. By far the dominant statistic still in use until the 1980s was 
the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), in which the market shares 
of the four largest firms in the industry were added together. Occa­
sionally broader concentration ratios were used, such as CR6 or CR8. 
A merger that would significantly increase the CR statistic was 
thought to create monopolistic market power, enabling the new seller 
to raise price well above cost, which caused social inefficiencies and 
justified enjoinment of the merger. But the CR statistic, without 
theoretical justification, ignored all but the largest firms. In the 1980s, 
a less arbitrary measure was adopted by federal regulators. The Her­
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findahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)—the sum of all firms’ squared mar­
ket shares—measured concentration of the entire industry rather 
than just the largest firms. The HHI ranges from near zero to reflect 
perfect competition (large number of firms each with infinitesimal 
market shares) to 10,000 indicating perfect monopoly (a single firm 
with a 100 market share). The HHI embodies the SCP approach in a 
single statistic, and has also become a central tool (though not the 
only one) of antitrust enforcement. Currently, the federal govern­
ment’s official merger guidelines classify any merger resulting in an 
HHI above 1,800 to be highly concentrated.1 
Bringing Down the SCP Paradigm: Chicago Political Economy 
The legitimacy of the SCP approach, particularly in its reliance on 
a single statistic, came under criticism with the maturing of the eco­
nomics profession. Scholars affiliated primarily with the University of 
Chicago, but also UCLA and the University of Virginia, amassed a 
body of theory and evidence known as Chicago Political Economy 
that delineated a richer picture of the market. The essence of Chicago 
Political Economy is twofold.2 First, the approach emphasized the 
characteristics of the individual firm (rather than the industry as a 
whole), particularly the cost structure and its implied competitive 
stature. Despite a firm’s proclivities toward monopolization, the 
forces of competition, determined by industry cost structure, imposed 
constraints on attempts to monopolize. This greatly enhanced econo­
mists’ understanding of the market’s ability to achieve efficiency on its 
own. Second, Chicago Political Economy emphasized the incentives 
that the legal structure imposed on rational, cost- and benefit-
calculating firms and individuals. An arbitrarily defined antitrust en­
vironment, for example, would undermine the stability of the incen­
tives that firms face and lead to new inefficiencies These two pillars, 
while an oversimplification of Chicago Political Economy, created a 
theoretical infrastructure to which the SCP approach compared as 
atheoretical, descriptive, and arbitrary, rather than analytical and ob­
jective. The effect was to undermine the SCP inferences regarding 
empirical observations of the market. Early empirical research under 
the SCP paradigm, for example, showed that when CR4 increased 
above 40 percent, prices began to rise significantly. In similar fashion, 
profits were shown to rise significantly between CR4 of 45 percent 
1See the merger guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
(1992: sec. 1.5).
 
2Chicago School economics is perhaps most comprehensively gathered in Posner (1992).
 




and 59 percent. Within these ranges, antitrust enforcement was jus­
tified and typically pursued. However, these correlations were soon 
criticized under the Chicago theoretical apparatus. Rising profits 
were now viewed as the result of economies of scale producing falling 
short-run costs, not monopoly pricing. 
Chicago Political Economy took the threat of monopolization se­
riously and contained scope for monopoly behavior to manifest itself 
both theoretically and in practice. But the approach forced analysts to 
consider the broader competitive environment of an industry as de­
termined by the cost structure of the firms in the market, not simply 
the number of firms or the concentration of the market, before pro­
nouncing judgment. Industry structure was still a key to the econom­
ics of antitrust, but a single statistic such as the CR4 or HHI would be 
insufficient for establishing an antitrust concern. You also have to 
search for the balancing effect of economies of scale. 
The Virginia School 
The enforcement of antitrust came under scrutiny with the appli­
cation of public choice theory to the FTC and DOJ. Antitrust law had 
always been justified by its stated objectives of protecting consumers 
and the public interest. Few ever seriously questioned this until, in 
the early 1970s, economists of the Virginia School began to investi­
gate the origins and effects of antitrust.3 In Virginia Political 
Economy, political agents are best characterized using the same ra­
tional choice theoretical bases used to explain economic agents. 
When applied to antitrust regulators and congressional overseers, this 
approach achieved a superior explanatory and predictive theory of the 
way antitrust worked in practice. The vaunted public-interest stan­
dard was difficult to detect in empirical studies of actual policy de­
cisions. Antitrust was never intended to achieve, nor did it engender, 
an enhanced competitive market.4 According to the Virginia perspec­
3The Virginia approach to antitrust is best exemplified in the collected volume by McChes­
ney and Shughart (1994). See also, however, Mackay, Miller, and Yandle (1987). Virginia 
scholars have criticized Chicago Political Economy for seemingly inexplicably upholding a 
public-interest theory of the intents (though not effects) of antitrust. See, e.g., McChesney 
(1991). In an interview with Thomas W. Hazlett (1984), George Stigler had praise for 
antitrust, saying the Sherman Act is “a public interest law . . . in the same sense in which 
I think having private property, enforcement of contract, and suppression of crime are 
public-interest phenomena . . . I like the Sherman Act.” 
4See Stigler (1985) on the origins of the Sherman Act, and Ekelund, McDonald, and 
Tollison (1995) on the origins of the Clayton Act. For a more recent treatment of the private 
interest origins of antitrust statutes, see Ramı́rez and Eigen-Zucchi (2001). On the private-
interest effects of antitrust, see the survey by Tollison (1985). 
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tive, antitrust was intended for, and achieved, a suppression of com­
petition in order to redistribute wealth from relatively competitive 
firms to their less competitive rivals (e.g., Faith, Leavens, and Tollison 
1982). As such, rather than creating societal benefits, antitrust en­
forcement was socially costly, and ought to be pursued selectively if at 
all (Shughart and Tollison 1991). 
Combined with the rigors of Chicago Political Economy, the Vir­
ginia critique undermined the validity of antitrust enforcement in a 
manner from which it would prove difficult to overcome—at least 
intellectually. Not only would regulators’ economic analysis be scru­
tinized but also their stated objectives vis-à -vis the actual effects of 
their enforcement. 
The Theory of Contestable Markets 
The economics of antitrust underwent another phase of develop­
ment with contestable market theory in the early 1980s. The theory of 
contestable markets offered yet a more dynamic view of competition. 
Industry structure would still determine the competitiveness of the 
market, as with the SCP and Chicago approaches. Moreover, costs 
would primarily define the structure of the market, as with the Chi­
cago approach. However, contestable market theory showed unam­
biguously that concentration—i.e., number of firms in the market— 
has little to do with industry structure, a feat that eluded Chicago 
economics. Moreover, the analysis would extend to multiproduct 
firms, an obvious empirical challenge with which Chicago economics 
did not contend. The boldness of these advances created great con­
troversy, but ultimately widespread acceptance, about the theory of 
contestable markets. 
The central element of the new theory became focusing primarily 
on the conditions of entry and exit to the market. The SCP paradigm 
had no explanation for why an industry would be concentrated. It was 
a descriptive story rather than an analytical theory. The contestability 
approach, on the other hand, rigorously specified the alternative con­
ditions under which a prediction of competitive behavior will emerge. 
Specifically, if the incumbent producers in a market face competition 
either from existing firms or potential entrants, then the incumbent 
producers will price competitively. Even if there is only a single 
incumbent producer, prices will still be competitive if there remains 
the threat of competition from potential entrants into the market. 
Therefore, the conditions of entry and exit, not concentration, define 
industry structure. And, in turn, free entry and exit are defined by the 
absence of sunk costs to entering the market. Researchers in contest­
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able market theory have shown that only under highly restrictive 
conditions, in which a secondary market for start-up costs does not 
exist, will sunk costs be significant enough to make entry and exit 
prohibitive. Hence, only under highly restrictive conditions will an 
industry structure that is conducive to monopolistic pricing behavior 
actually prevail.5 
The implications of the contestability approach for antitrust were 
profound. Concentration mattered very little to determining the com­
petitiveness of an industry. Even a single producer could behave as if 
it were in a perfectly competitive market, so long as free entry and exit 
ensured that it faced competition from potential challengers. The 
definition of monopoly that was acceptable to economic theory was 
now quite restrictive, even more so than under a Chicago approach. 
As a result, the intellectual scope for antitrust enforcement narrowed 
still more. 
The Theoretical Inheritance of 1990s’ Antitrust Enforcement 
In the face of a superior theory of markets and also a superior 
theory of politics, the SCP approach so friendly to activist antitrust 
enforcement was severely undermined. In its place stood a rigorous 
theory of the market, which improved economists’ understanding of 
competition and monopoly. When applied to actual markets and con­
sistently interpreted, antitrust economics typically denied the pres­
ence of an antitrust concern. Moreover, under public choice theory, 
antitrust was subject to the scrutiny of the institutional environment 
that structured the individual regulator’s incentives. The bottom line 
at the beginning of the 1990s was a narrow scope for antitrust, relative 
to decades past. 
In order to increase that scope, to revive antitrust, activists might 
attempt to resurrect the validity of the SCP paradigm. But such an 
attempt would likely fail to gain legitimization: 30 years of a maturing 
body of research stood in its way. Alternatively, activists may attempt 
to create something new, a different theory. It is apparent that “uni­
lateral effects” and “innovation markets” serve this purpose.6 Each of 
5For the seminal contribution to contestable market theory, see Baumol (1982). For a 
review of this theory, see either Spence (1983) or Brock (1983). The founders of the 
contestable market approach have gathered their research in a collected volume, Baumol, 
Panzar, and Willig (1988). 
6It should be noted that other innovations have been introduced to antitrust enforcement 
in recent years. The DOJ’s Sherman Act case against Microsoft, for example, makes heavy 
use of “path dependence” terminology, as well as network externality and systems market 
theory pioneered by economists Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro (1994). Also, game theory 
models of strategic behavior, specifically non-price predation such as “raising rivals’ costs” 
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these is an attempt to adopt what resembles a new theory, so as to 
support activist antitrust enforcement. But I intend to show that 
neither is analytically different from the SCP approach, and therefore 
cannot be justified in light of modern economic theory. With each in 
turn, I will put forth its basic description, an illustration of how the 
FTC and DOJ have used it in practice, and a critical assessment to 
argue that such usage is misplaced. 
Innovation Markets Analysis 
Innovation market analysis identifies a market as anti-competitive 
where a market does not even exist. According to the 1995 Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, an innovation 
market is defined as “the research and development directed to par­
ticular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes 
for that research and development.”7 In other words, the “product” of 
an “innovation market” is the R&D of future goods. Supporters of 
antitrust activism have emphasized the market is increasingly tech­
nologically sophisticated. As more industries become technologically 
based, and as technological markets represent more of the economy, 
a competitive environment in technology markets becomes more im­
portant to social efficiency. Increasingly, regulators have emphasized 
the potentially anti-competitive aspects of innovation in the markets 
they investigate. 
Innovation Markets in Practice 
Antitrust regulators have begun to use the idea of “innovation mar­
kets” to evaluate proposed mergers. If a merger threatens to make an 
“innovation market” anti-competitive, regulators could enjoin the 
merger on the logic that the new firm would have monopoly power in 
developing new technology for the downstream product market. Con­
centration in product markets now becomes less important to defin­
ing an antitrust market. With the “innovation market” approach, regu­
lators can now justify enforcement where earlier approaches would 
not. 
(Salop and Scheffman 1983, Coate and Kleit 1994) have been discussed by antitrust officials 
(though I cannot find explicit applications to actual cases). These other innovations lie afield 
from this paper’s purposes because (1) these theories are not readily applicable to hori­
zontal merger analysis; (2) these theories, unlike innovation markets and unilateral effects, 
were first developed within economic science; and (3) discussing these other theories in 
responsible detail would increase the size of this paper to an impractical length. 
7U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1995: sec. 3.2.2). 
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The DOJ employed innovation market analysis as early as Novem­
ber 1993. A German heavy transmission manufacturer, ZF of Fried­
richshafen, proposed to acquire General Motors’ Allison Transmis­
sion Division. DOJ considered the relevant “innovation market” to be 
dominated by the two firms, and filed a complaint in the Federal 
District Court of Delaware, arguing that the merger would cause an 
“unacceptable concentration” of the innovation market for this par­
ticular sort of transmission. Soon after the DOJ filed its complaint, the 
firms abandoned the merger (Bingaman 1994). 
Innovation market analysis officially became an element of merger 
review with the new Intellectual Property Guidelines in 1995.8 That 
same year, innovation market analysis was applied in the govern­
ment’s decision to enjoin the merger between Microsoft and Intuit. 
The two firms competed in the market for personal finance software, 
but the DOJ considered them to be competitors in new software 
developments. The benefits of this competition had been, up to that 
point, improved product quality and lower prices. But the DOJ ar­
gued that the proposed merger would have increased concentration 
unacceptably in both the product and innovation markets. Microsoft 
agreed to divest its Money software package to Novell, a move that 
would have deconcentrated the product market and likely cleared the 
merger under current antitrust theories. But the government argued 
that Novell would not be a forceful competitor in personal finance 
software, particularly in the innovation market.9 As a result, the ben­
efits of superior products at lower prices were at risk. On that basis, 
the merger was enjoined. 
Critiquing Innovation Markets 
An “innovation market” as specified by the IP Guidelines is of 
dubious definition. Certainly R&D is an economic activity, in which 
firms try to minimize error and garner a profitable outcome. That is 
why R&D is a competitive process. But to characterize new technolo­
gies as the product of competition for innovations—in the same sense 
in which sport-utility vehicles are the product of competition for 
consumer dollars—is to mistake the meaning of markets. In truth, the 
process of R&D cannot be characterized as a market because ex­
change is absent. R&D is typically unilateral and private. In fact, it is 
usually rather secretive. A firm does not directly sell its R&D, and so 
8U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1995: sec. 3.2.2).
 
9U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. and Intuit Corp. “Complaint for Injunctive Relief Against Violation
 
of Section 7 of Clayton Act,” U.S. District Court, N. Calif., 27 April 1995.
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gathers no revenues until successful innovations are introduced in the 
downstream product market. Only once the innovation is produced, 
marketed, and sold does a market develop. In short, the success of an 
R&D venture can be evaluated only after the fact. An “innovation 
market,” as defined by the government’s IP Guidelines, does not yet 
truly exist. An “innovation market” cannot be defined or measured, 
nor can its competitors be identified, nor can their respective degrees 
of market power be gauged. Such an analytical void is unhelpful and 
perhaps harmful. More specifically, it is too restrictive, analytically 
redundant, and inconsistent with the agencies’ principles of enforce­
ment. 
Type I Error. The use of “innovation market analysis” is highly 
prone to a Type I Error. In merger regulation, a Type I Error would 
be to reject a merger that was not really anti-competitive—for ex­
ample, if the Microsoft-Intuit merger, blocked by DOJ, would have 
created net social benefits. Because innovation market analysis intro­
duces inherent difficulties in trying to measure the competitiveness of 
a market that does not truly exist, antitrust regulators are especially 
prone to Type I Errors. Under innovation market analysis, then, an­
titrust would be biased toward imposing net harm on consumers. The 
reason is rather simple: because an innovation market does not truly 
exist, regulators cannot gather the information required to make a 
clear assessment of the “market” to make the right decision.10 
For example, when looking at the production of R&D, how do 
regulators define the relevant market? The reality of R&D makes the 
problem acutely difficult because most R&D projects overlap into the 
innovation of several products. Companies are also notoriously secre­
tive about their new products while still in development, making the 
outcomes of R&D nebulous until released. In fact, for this same 
reason even determining the participants—the relevant firms—in an 
“innovation market” is a dilemma. If regulators nonetheless justify 
some definition of the market and its participants, how are they then 
to measure the structure of the market? Firms do not generate direct 
sales from their research efforts, and market shares cannot be deter­
mined where there are no revenues. Measuring the share of R&D 
expenditures does not improve matters either. Again, a firm’s R&D 
budget goes into the production of many different innovations. Even 
two firms who clearly compete in a product market might produce 
entirely unrelated goods from simultaneous R&D efforts. There is no 
10For a complete exposition of this argument, see Rapp (1995). A view supportive of 
innovation market analysis argues it is necessary to protect against Type II Errors, i.e., 
allowing anti-competitive mergers to proceed (Gilbert 1995). 
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consistent connection between R&D expenditures and new innova­
tions that would compete in product markets. 
It is difficult enough for antitrust regulators to estimate the com­
petitive attributes of existing product markets. This new approach 
ignores the information problems associated with trying to estimate 
the competitiveness of a market that is not even there. Moreover, 
even if regulators are talented and diligent enough to define the 
relevant market, identify market participants, and determine market 
structure, there is no clear economic reason to expect concentration 
in R&D markets to be anti-competitive (Jorde and Teece 1990). 
Analytical Redundancy. Using innovation market analysis to regu­
late a merger is redundant. Innovation market analysis already pre­
sumes that the merging firms will be competitors in the downstream 
product market. To see this, imagine a merger between two firms in 
an R&D-intensive industry. To invoke innovation market analysis, 
antitrust regulators must first assume the two firms are horizontally 
related in innovation. One possibility is that the two firms are then 
horizontal competitors in the downstream product markets. This 
would, in principle, adequately define an antitrust market. But it 
could be addressed using conventional merger analysis. The other 
possibility is that the firms are not downstream competitors, in which 
case there is no antitrust concern, even in innovation. The combined 
R&D efforts, after all, would span an array of product innovations, 
failing to overlap, and would therefore not retard innovation.11 It is 
difficult to see what innovation market analysis adds: any case that 
would call for innovation market analysis can be adequately analyzed 
using conventional horizontal merger analysis, without inordinate risk 
of Type II Error. 
Still, guarding against the Type II Error is a major reason cited for 
the relevance of innovation markets analysis. Rapp (1995) and Gilbert 
and Sunshine (1995) argue that the conventional “potential compe­
tition” doctrine of merger analysis cannot detect anti-competitive ef­
fects in innovation. But there is little agreement that the potential 
competition doctrine falters, allowing mergers that are actually anti-
competitive to proceed. Instead, existing merger enforcement is bi­
ased toward the Type I Error, in a manner similar to the FDA’s bias 
toward disallowing new medical devices until they are proven inor­
dinately to be safe and effective (Campbell 2000). Rather than a new 
theory, the innovation market approach is merely a weak substitute 
11One theoretical exception to this scenario that would create scope for antitrust concern 
is discussed by Addanki (1995). He notes, however, that this scope is narrow and chances 
for an actual antitrust concern are remote. 
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for the doctrine of potential competition. One seasoned antitrust econ­
omist testified that “in most applications, the innovation market ap­
proach is merely superfluous—a new way of talking about potential 
competition” (Rapp 1995: 20). The innovation market approach has 
been called a “stealth weapon” and a thin disguise for traditional analysis 
(Hoerner 1995). Absent any substantive contribution, innovation 
markets remains a superfluous, redundant tool for analyzing mergers. 
Inconsistency with Underlying Principles of Enforcement. The in­
novation market approach violates the methodological strictures sug­
gested by the antitrust authorities themselves. There are two clear 
examples of this. First, the central element of antitrust analysis is the 
estimation of market structure. Antitrust regulators clearly value the 
objectivity of quantitative measures of market power, such as the 
HHI statistic. But the innovation markets approach is inherently 
speculative. There is no actual good being produced and traded in an 
“innovation market.” There are no revenues on which to base a firm’s 
“innovation market” share. Hence, there is no basis upon which to 
construct an HHI or even something more basic such as a CR. It is 
even more ambiguous devising a measure of market structure that is 
consistent with contestability theory. Entry conditions cannot be es­
tablished when the relevant market cannot be defined. The govern­
ment betrays its own standards for enforcing antitrust when it em­
braces the vagueness and arbitrariness of attempting to objectively 
define and evaluate a market that does not actually exist. 
Second, the innovation market approach is inconsistent with the 
underlying theory of harm put forth in the Horizontal Merger Guide­
lines (Widnell 1998). In the guidelines, social harm is created when 
industry structure imparts sufficient market power to one firm or a 
group of firms. But, as explained above, to measure industry structure 
in an innovation market is difficult if not impossible. An implication 
of the economic critique of innovation market analysis, therefore, is a 
subsequent legal critique. Since regulators cannot measure market 
power in an R&D setting, they cannot assert a social cost that is 
consistent with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and they cannot, 
therefore, legally enforce the Clayton Act’s provisions on horizontal 
mergers. 
Unilateral Effects 
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines describe the FTC’s and 
DOJ’s objectives in defining the relevant market for merger analysis. 
The stated policy is for the government to examine conditions under 
which an antitrust concern would be most likely to emerge. On the 
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one hand, the guidelines aim to evaluate mergers “within the context 
of economically meaningful markets.” However, “economically mean­
ingful” is then apparently defined as a sufficiently narrow market such 
that the merged firm would necessarily possess market power (and, 
hence, the ability to exercise it).12 The methodology of the 1992 
guidelines, therefore, creates a bias toward narrowly defining relevant 
markets—indeed, toward such a narrow definition that there exist 
effectively no substitutes for the good in question, by which there is 
necessarily a monopoly producer. One important justification for nar­
rowly defining the product market is the potential for so-called uni­
lateral effects. This doctrine of analysis represents a second attempt 
to avoid the intellectual inheritance of 1990s’ antitrust enforcement, 
and to thereby broaden the scope for merger enforcement. 
After defining the relevant market, investigators then try to detect 
the ability for merging firms to increase price. Exercise of market 
power is divided into coordinated and individualized actions among 
producers (in game theory, cooperative and noncooperative behav­
ior). The unilateral effects doctrine represents the latter. The idea, as 
presented in the Merger Guidelines, is as follows. In certain markets, 
competitors do not produce direct substitutes for one another. In­
stead, these markets are characterized by product differentiation. 
However, not all products are equally differentiated—some may be 
closer substitutes for each other than for other goods in the market. 
Hence, competition among firms selling closer substitutes is greater 
than among firms selling more distant substitutes, even though they 
are all in the same market. In such a differentiated market, a merger 
between firms whose products are close substitutes would create 
market power, enabling the merged firm to unilaterally raise prices 
for their products above the pre-merger level. Moreover, greater 
substitutability between the products will result in a more severe 
price increase. With unilateral effects, certain mergers create market 
power even where collusion among producers is not sustainable. 
Unilateral Effects in Practice 
The FTC used the doctrine of unilateral effects to analyze the 
proposed merger between Guinness and Grand Metropolitan, two 
British conglomerates, in December 1997.13 The merged firm’s com-
12U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1992: sec. 1.1.0). 
13Though these companies are headquartered in London, the FTC found an antitrust 
concern because, for their purposes, the relevant geographic market was defined as the 
United States. The FTC announced that it worked in concert with antitrust authorities from 
the European Community, Canada, Australia, and Mexico on this case. 
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bined assets would total $36 billion, spanning an array of well-known 
companies including Burger King, Pillsbury, and Guinness beers. 
Consistent with the Merger Guidelines, the FTC focused on the 
narrowly defined product markets in which the merging firms were 
close competitors: the premium gin and premium blended scotch 
markets. The top brand of gin in America at the time was Tanquerey, 
followed by Bombay and then Beefeater. The merged firm would 
have controlled the first two brands. In blended scotch, the top brand 
at the time was Dewar’s, but Jonnie Walker and J&B were also popu­
lar brands. The merged firm would have accounted for all three. The 
FTC filed a proposed consent order on December 15, 1997, recom­
mending the divestiture of the Dewar’s and Bombay labels, respec­
tively first- and second-best selling brands (Federal Trade Commis­
sion 1997). In drafting the consent order, the FTC defined the prod­
uct market as “premium distilled spirits.” Thus, when defining the 
relevant gin market, the FTC used only the top three brands. Ac­
cording to the government, therefore, the only reasonable substitutes 
consumers would have for the Bombay label of gin were Tanqueray 
and Beefeater. So if the prices among these three brands all in­
creased, consumers would be unable to substitute into rail brands of 
gin (i.e., non-name brand) or other kinds of distilled spirits or alco­
holic drinks. They would simply have to pay the higher price. Under 
such a narrow definition of the relevant market, Guinness and Grand 
Met combined to a 73 percent market share, and were found to be 
capable of unilaterally increasing price. Very similarly, the relevant 
blended scotch market was defined using only the top four brands, of 
which the two firms owned three and accounted for 92 percent of the 
market. Unilateral effects were predicted here as well. In March of 
1998, the merged firm announced the sale of the Dewar’s and Bom­
bay labels to rival firm Barcardi International for $1.9 billion. FTC 
Commissioner William J. Baer promptly hailed this as “a record sum 
in a government mandated divestiture” (Baer 1998). 
In another high profile case, the unilateral effects doctrine was also 
applied in enjoining the merger between Staples and Office Depot in 
April of 1997. Here again, the key to the government’s ruling was the 
definition of the relevant market. Despite there being many choices 
for consumers in purchasing office supplies, the FTC defined the 
relevant market as “office supply superstores” (Baer 1997). With Of­
fice Max representing the only other “superstore,” this amounted to 
defining away most potential substitutes. The FTC ruled that the 
merger would cause an unacceptable concentration of this narrowly 
defined market in several of the defined geographic markets (metro­
politan areas). Divestiture would not suffice. Even though the merg­
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ing firms agreed to sell dozens of key stores to Office Max, the 
government recommended full injunctive relief on the grounds that 
the post-merger firm could exercise monopoly power, and that con­
sumers would suffer from increased prices. The Court ruled in favor 
of the FTC and the merger was enjoined. 
Critique of Unilateral Effects Doctrine 
Similar to innovation markets, the unilateral effects doctrine is 
suspect on several fronts. Little if any direct theoretical support can 
be found for unilateral effects within economic science. Also, unilat­
eral effects, similar to the old SCP approach, neglects the importance 
of potential competition and the dynamics of the marketplace. In 
particular, it fails to emphasize industry structure as a guide to merger 
analysis. And, finally, the doctrine has been applied in ways that are 
inconsistent with the motivation provided in the Merger Guidelines. 
Weak Basis in Economic Theory. Unilateral effects analysis has 
very little direct basis in economic theory. Certainly there is a litera­
ture on product differentiation, and much of this is focused specifi­
cally on the antitrust implications of such markets. However, there is 
no published study detailing the economic theory behind the alleged 
phenomenon of unilateral effects. The reason is simple. Any journal 
editor today would reject such an article on the basis that the theory 
had been developed over 50 years ago. Unilateral effects describes 
nothing more than the ability of a firm to single-handedly influence 
market price without losing all of its sales. It is a simple argument that 
came into existence under the SCP paradigm and manifested empiri­
cally as CR statistics. As such, unilateral effects is no more justified by 
economic theory than the old SCP approach. Antitrust regulators 
have simply borrowed language from newer economics literature on 
strategic behavior to resurrect the SCP approach and to recreate a 
means of more narrowly defining relevant markets in order to more 
effectively argue, given the paucity of close and available substitutes, 
that market power would be exercised. 
While it is true that the Merger Guidelines are explicit in saying 
that unilateral effects are intended for demand analysis, and that 
supply analysis of entry conditions is not to be neglected, recent 
judgments have weighed the demand evidence much more heavily. 
The FTC’s brief in the Staples case, for example, had already reached 
its conclusions before the section on entry analysis. Contrary to the 
accepted tenets of modern antitrust economics, the conditions of 
entry are being treated as secondary, almost an afterthought, in the 
wake of seemingly impressive evidence that price effects would be 
likely. But again, the Merger Guidelines stress that price setting 
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power is not a sufficient condition for an antitrust concern. It is only 
a necessary condition. The ability to exercise market power success­
fully hinges on the ability to keep potential challengers from entering 
the market. The overemphasis on unilateral effects is to the neglect of 
truer measures of anti-competitiveness. 
Unilateral Effects Represents a Retreat in the Economics of Anti­
trust. Along with the sophisticated appearances of the new theories of 
antitrust have come advances in the technology brought to bear on 
antitrust analysis. In particular, increases in computing power and 
ubiquitous use of point-of-sale checkout scanners have presented new 
opportunities for antitrust regulators. With scanners, retailers amass 
detailed price and quantity data on every item they sell. Better soft­
ware and faster computers enable analysts at FTC and DOJ to orga­
nize these huge amounts of information and “let the data speak.” For 
example, in the Staples enjoinment, FTC attorneys used pre-merger 
scanner data to simulate the effects on post-merger prices. Using a 
cross section of prices in various metropolitan areas, analysts were 
able to use actual market data, rather than vague inferences based on 
concentration statistics, to evaluate the merger. Indeed, analysts de­
tected an existing pattern in the pricing data. “Staples and Office 
Depot today charge higher prices in those parts of the county where 
they do not compete against each other and lower prices where they 
are rivals” (Baer, et al. 1997: 2, “Preliminary Statement”). Apparently, 
the appropriate inference is self-evident. “Since prices are signifi­
cantly lower where Office Depot and Staples compete, eliminating 
their head-to-head competition will free the parties to charge higher 
prices” (Baer, et al. 1997: 25, sec. IV.A). 
Several prominent antitrust observers have been rather taken by 
the sophistication and objectivity of this new, data-rich approach. In 
an article, “The Trustbusters’ New Tools,” The Economist (1998a: 63) 
reports, “For the first time, [regulators] have the ability to predict 
whether a merger will raise prices for consumers.” In a related edi­
torial, The Economist (1998b: 16) notes, “Today’s competition au­
thorities should be praised for judiciously putting their new econom­
ics to use.” Elsewhere, CFO magazine writes, “[Regulators] think 
they can make the heretofore invisible hand of competition quite 
visible” (Gross 1997: 87). FTC Chairman Robert Pitovsky (1997) 
joined the praise: “When such data is available,” he said, “it surely 
offers a more reliable description of the ‘competitive arena’ in which 
rivalry occurs than we have sometimes seen in past merger cases.” 
These are certainly impressive endorsements. But whether the Staples-
Office Depot and Guinness-Grand Metro mergers were anti-competi­
tive or not, using scanner data in this manner to support these sorts 
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of inferences is flawed in two fundamental ways. First, the approach 
abandons the importance of industry structure. Second, and more 
serious, the approach yields biased predictions of post-merger prices. 
A constant in the maturation of industrial organization has been the 
centrality of industry structure to the competitiveness of the market. 
The legal rules, cost conditions, and entry concerns are all fundamen­
tal to whether a firm can exercise market power. Relying solely on 
empirical observations of current pricing patterns, without the theo­
retical context of the market’s structure, is unfounded. In the Staples-
Office Depot case, again, the FTC did not wholly ignore industry 
structure. Concentration ratios and HHIs were calculated for the 
relevant product and geographic markets, and the brief includes a 
minor section on the analysis of entry conditions. However, these 
elements of the brief are plainly treated as secondary. The FTC 
places its main emphasis on the scanner data analysis. Before the 
section that analyzes entry conditions, the brief reads: “In sum, the 
Court has direct evidence, buttressed by the parties’ pricing and other 
documents, establishing that this merger . . . will result in the loss of 
present as well as future competition. The harm to consumers from a 
merger has never been so clear” (Baer, et al. 1997: 27, sec. IV.A.3). 
The FTC makes this conclusion based on concentration and the new 
scanner data. Entry conditions are an afterthought. Such a conclusion 
and the resultant judgment represent a retreat, not an advance, in the 
economics of antitrust. There is no explanation for why the pricing 
data appear as they do. There is no inquiry into whether the current 
or future conditions of the market will support the exercise of market 
power. There is only the apparently self-evident inference that pat­
terns in today’s scanner data will prevail tomorrow, and therefore the 
merger is anti-competitive. This analysis is counter to a central tenet 
of industrial organization: firms cannot be said to raise prices suc­
cessfully unless industry structure is accounted for. Ignoring industry 
structure in this manner takes us back to descriptive and atheoretical 
criteria for antitrust enforcement, and reintroduces arbitrariness to 
the enforcement of antitrust, which further enables regulators to pur­
sue private interests. 
This new, real-world use of scanner data is even more seriously 
flawed in another way. The 1994 Nobel Prize in Economic Science 
was awarded to Robert Lucas for his development of the theory of 
rational expectations. Rational expectations theory acknowledges the 
forward-looking characteristics of markets, in particular suppliers and 
their pricing decisions. The most important implication of rational 
expectations theory is represented in a 1976 study that challenges the 
use of econometric data analysis to simulate the impacts of alternative 
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policy actions (Lucas 1976). Lucas argued that empirical data are the 
manifestation of underlying market relationships, but that these re­
lationships would not remain stable in the face of a policy change. 
However, any simulation of alternative policy changes must implicitly 
rely on the underlying relationships remaining stable. The result, as 
Lucas showed, is systematically biased estimates of the effects of a 
policy change. 
When applied to analysis of scanner data to evaluate a merger, 
Lucas’s critique is no less damaging. The FTC inferred that, simply 
because Staples currently prices higher in markets where it does not 
face competition from Office Depot, any post-merger market with 
fewer suppliers would also feature monopoly pricing. Just like policy 
simulations before Lucas, the FTC’s analysis implicitly relied on the 
assumption that the pre-merger underlying economic relationships 
would be stable and also prevail in the post-merger market. But the 
FTC cannot support this assumption because the brief fails to delve 
into these underlying economic relationships. For example, there is 
no explanation for why Staples and Office Depot compete head-to­
head in certain markets but not others. There is no inquiry into the 
extent of alternative markets. There is no explanation for site selection 
in the industry and how the merger might affect that. There is only 
basic observation with the convenience of scanner data and its so­
phisticated facade. But applying Lucas’s reasoning shows that these 
economic relationships, which the FTC ignored, will not remain 
stable beyond the merger. As a result, the FTC’s estimation of the 
post-merger market is very likely statistically biased. 
The use of new data sources can be used to support theories other 
than unilateral effects, but unilateral effects have been supported 
first. There are laudable and sensible reasons for pursuing better 
information of the marketplace. But the Merger Guidelines never 
explicitly cite sophisticated data gathering as grounds for an antitrust 
concern. The data must match an underlying theory of the market 
and a predicted effect of a proposed merger. Combined, the two 
criticisms above severely undermine the use of unilateral effects. The 
doctrine must be viewed as atheoretical, descriptive, and biased, 
rather than analytical, rigorous, and objective, which is what the 
Merger Guidelines call for. 
Misapplication to Nondifferentiated Products. Finally, the Merger 
Guidelines explicitly discuss unilateral effects in the context of mar­
kets with differentiated products. Yet it is not at all clear that the 
approach has been applied in markets with differentiated products. 
As stated earlier, unilateral effects are deemed a concern in mar­
kets that feature differentiated products. In such markets, horizontal 
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mergers can produce harm if the firms’ products are close substitutes 
for each other. More importantly, the closer the substitutability of the 
merging firms’ products, the more severe a price increase the merger 
will produce (all other things being equal). This is introduced in the 
Merger Guidelines, and is directly quoted with emphasis in the FTC’s 
brief in Staples. But before any mention of differentiated product 
markets, the Merger Guidelines suggest defining the relevant product 
market as narrowly as possible. Let us see, then, how the use of 
unilateral effects would bear on a proposed merger. As a product 
market is increasingly narrowly defined, the scope for product differ­
entiation is also increasingly narrowed. In such a narrowly defined 
market, the goods of two merging firms cannot be closer substitutes 
for each other than for their competitors’ goods. Are Dewar’s and 
J&B really closer substitutes for each other than are Dewar’s and 
Jonnie Walker? Are Staples and Office Depot really closer substitutes 
for each other than are Staples and Office Max? Because the Merger 
Guidelines encourage a narrow product market definition, the 
merged firm could unilaterally impose only a relatively small increase 
in price. There is not sufficient product differentiation in a suffi­
ciently narrowly defined market to support the prediction of unilat­
eral effects. In attempting to support increased merger enforcement, 
antitrust authorities have instead mopped themselves into a corner, 
from which consistent application of the unilateral effects doctrine is 
inconsistent with the Merger Guidelines more generally. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have discussed the development and application of 
“innovation market” and “unilateral effect” analyses to merger inves­
tigations. In light of the economics of antitrust, the development of 
which I have also traced, neither of these new instruments for merger 
analysis can be supported in theory. Given the regulatory agencies’ 
own exhortation to ground merger analysis in a sound analytical 
framework, one must conclude that innovation markets and unilateral 
effects ought not to be relied upon in future merger investigations. 
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